We consider a monopolist that is selling n items to a single additive buyer, where the buyer's values for the items are drawn according to independent distributions F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n that possibly have unbounded support. It is well known that -unlike in the single item case -the revenue-optimal auction (a pricing scheme) may be complex, sometimes requiring a continuum of menu entries. It is also known that simple auctions with a nite bounded number of menu entries can extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Nonetheless, the question of the possibility of extracting an arbitrarily high fraction of the optimal revenue via a nite menu size remained open.
INTRODUCTION
As familiar economic institutions move to computerized platforms, they are reaching unprecedented sizes and levels of complexity. These new levels of complexity often become the de ning feature of the computerized economic scenario, as in the cases of spectrum auctions and ad auctions. The use of the word "complexity" here is intentionally vague, and can refer to a wide variety of computational, informational, or descriptive measures of complexity. A high-level goal of the eld of "Economics and Computation" is to analyze such measures of complexity and understand the degree to which they are indeed a bottleneck to achieving desired economic properties.
This paper studies exactly such a question in the recently wellstudied scenario of pricing multiple items. The scenario is that of a monopolist seller who is selling n items to a single additive buyer. The buyer has a private value i for each item i, where each i is distributed according to a commonly known prior distribution F i , independently of the values of the other items. The valuation of the buyer is assumed to be additive, so that her value for a subset S of the items is simply i ∈S i , and the seller's goal is to design an "auction" (really just a a pricing scheme) that maximizes her revenue. The classical economic analysis (Myerson 1981) shows that for a single item, the optimal auction is simply to sell the item at some xed price. On the other hand, when there is more than a single item, it is known that the optimal auction may be surprisingly complex, randomized, and unintuitive (Daskalakis et al. 2013; Koutsoupias 2014, 2015; Hart and Reny 2015; Manelli and Vincent 2006; McAfee and McMillan 1988; Thanassoulis 2004) .
A signi cant amount of recent work has studied whether "simple" auctions may yield at least an approximately optimal revenue. Following a sequence of results Hart and Nisan 2012; Li and Yao 2013) , it was shown by Babaio et al. (2014) that one of the following two "simple" auctions always yields at least a constant fraction ( 1 /6) of the optimal revenue: either sell all items as a single take-it-or-leave-it bundle (for some carefully chosen price) or sell each item separately for its Myerson price. This was further extended (with di erent constants) to the case of multiple buyers (Yao 2015) and to buyers with sub-additive valuations (Rubinstein and Weinberg 2015) , but is in contrast to the case where the item values are distributed according to a joint (correlated) distribution, a case for which no nite approximation is possible by nite auctions (Briest et al. 2010; Hart and Nisan 2013) .
In this work, we study the trade-o between the complexity of an auction and the extent to which it can approximate the optimal revenue. One may choose various measures of auction complexity (Dughmi et al. 2014; Hart and Nisan 2013; Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2015) , and we will focus on the simplest one, the menu size suggested in Hart and Nisan (2013) . The menu size of an auction (for a single buyer, an auction is just a pricing scheme) is de ned to be the number of di erent possible outcomes of the auction. More speci cally, every single-buyer auction is equivalent to one that o ers a menu of options to the buyer, where each optionentry (ì x; p) -in the menu speci es a probability x i of acquiring each item i as well as a price p to be paid for the combination ì x, and the buyer chooses an entry that maximizes her own expected utility i x i · i −p. The number of entries in the menu is de ned to be the menu-size complexity of the auction. The logarithm of the menu size is exactly equal to the deterministic communication complexity of the auction: the auction is considered common knowledge, and the buyer, who knows her private values, must send enough information (see Appendix A for a formal de nition) to the seller so that the outcome (allocation probabilities and price) of the auction for these values can be determined. 1 It is known that for some distributions, the optimal auction has in nite menu size (Daskalakis et al. 2013 ) but a constant fraction of the optimal revenue may be extracted by a nite-complexity auction (Babaio et al. 2014) . Is it possible to extract an arbitrarily high fraction of the optimal revenue via a nite menu size?
Our rst and main result shows that, in fact, nite complexity su ces to get arbitrarily close to the optimal revenue.
De nition 1.1 (Re C ; Re ). For a distribution F on n items, we denote by Re C (F ) the maximal (formally, the supremum) revenue obtainable by an individually rational incentive-compatible auction that has at most C menu entries and sells the n items to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are distributed according to F . We denote by Re (F ) = Re ∞ (F ) the maximal revenue obtainable without any complexity restrictions on the auction. Formally, our result shows that lim C→∞
Re (F ) = 1 uniformly across all product distributions F . In other words:
For every number of items n and every ε > 0, there exists a nite menu size C = C(n, ε) such that for every F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n ∈ ∆(R + ), we have that
Theorem 1.2 gives a positive answer to Open Problem 6 from Hart and Nisan (2014) , 2 which asks precisely whether the statement of Theorem 1.2 holds. It is natural to ask what is the rate of the uniform convergence of the sequence
Re (F ) . In other words, how complex must a revenue-approximating auction be?
De nition 1.3 (Revenue Approximation Complexity). For every number of items n and every ε > 0, we de ne the revenue approximation complexity C(n, ε) ∈ R + to be the smallest value C ∈ R + such that
The construction used in the proof of Theorem 1.2 gives an upper bound on C(n, ε) (i.e., a lower bound on the rate of uniform convergence of
For every number of items n, every ε > 0, and every F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n ∈ ∆(R + ), there exists an n-item auction with a deterministic communication complexity of only log C(n, ε) = O n log( n /ε) that approximates the optimal revenue from F 1 ×· · ·×F n up to a multiplicative ε loss.
This bound on the menu size is exponential in n, and so the next natural question is whether polynomial menu size su ces. At rst glance the answer seems to be "obviously not": the menusize complexity measure is quite weak, and even the auction that sells each item separately has exponential menu size (since, when presented as a menu, a menu entry is needed for each possible subset of the items). This answer, however, is premature; in fact, we show that polynomial menu size turns out to su ce for approximating the revenue obtainable from selling items separately. Let us denote by SRe (F 1 × · · · × F n ) the revenue obtainable by selling each item separately for its optimal price. T 1.5. For every ε > 0, there exists d(ε) such that for every number of items n and
The same bound applies also to the revenue obtainable by selling the items after arbitrarily prepartitioning them into bundles. Using the result of Babaio et al. (2014) , this immediately implies that polynomial menu size su ces for extracting a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. C 1.6. There exist a xed constant number d and a xed constant fraction α > 0 such that
The above reasoning shows that Corollary 1.6 holds for every α arbitrarily close to 1 /6, which is the constant fraction of the optimal revenue shown by Babaio et al. (2014) to be obtainable by the better of bundled selling and separate selling. Does polynomial menu size su ce for extracting revenue arbitrarily close to the optimal revenue? We prove that this is not the case, at least for ε that is polynomially small in n.
The proof of Theorem 1.7 shows, in fact, that polynomial dependence on ε is impossible even for approximating the revenue from selling the items separately. At this point, we leave two main problems open. The rst one is whether for every xed ε > 0, polynomial (or at least quasipolynomial) menu size su ces for approximating the optimal revenue to within a multiplicative ε. In terms of communication complexity, this translates to whether logarithmic or polylogarithmic deterministic communication su ces 4 for every xed value of ε. O P 1.8. Is it true that for every ε > 0, there exists
The second open problem (or rather, class of open problems) is whether stronger notions of auction description complexity may allow for better revenue in polynomial complexity. This may be asked with respect to any complexity measure, and it is not clear which speci c natural choice to consider, so an identi cation of such a measure is part of what is left open. 5
UPPER BOUND ON REVENUE-APPROXIMATION COMPLEXITY
In this section, we survey the proof of our main result, Theorem 1.2, which states that C(n, ε) is nite for every number of items n ∈ N and ε > 0, and moreover, that C(n, ε) ≤ ( n /ε) O (n) . The proof proceeds in four steps. Section 2.1 provides a rough overview of the proof strategy, Sections 2.3 through 2.6 provide the formal details of each of the four steps of the proof, and Section 2.7 connects the dots by combining the four steps. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes with a short discussion of the application of the proof steps to obtain uniform approximation results for correlated distributions over a restricted valuation space, which generalize bounded distributions.
Proof Overview
Let F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n be the respective distributions of the values of the n items. We will construct an auction with ( nite) menu size ( n /ε) O (n) that guarantees a (1 − ε) multiplicative approximation to the optimal revenue.
Limitations of Existing Techniques. One possible approach to approximate revenue maximization, taken by Li and Yao (2013) , Babaio et al. (2014) , and Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015) , is to use a core/tail decomposition and bound the revenue from (or the welfare of) the core and the revenue from the tail. Unfortunately, such a decomposition inherently entails a nonnegligible revenue loss (it only guarantees a constant fraction of the optimal revenue), either due to bounding the welfare of the core instead of the revenue from it, or due to estimating the total revenue using the revenues obtained by selling to the core and to the tail separately. Therefore, while this approach makes no assumptions regarding the valuation space (beyond independence), this technique, as used in the literature so far, is unsuitable for guaranteeing negligible loss in revenue as in the result that we seek.
Another possible approach, taken by Daskalakis and Weinberg (2012) , Hart and Nisan (2013) , and Dughmi et al. (2014) , is to round all possible menu entries onto a discrete grid via "nudge and round" operations. Unfortunately, for the grid (and thus the menu size) to be nite and for the revenue loss to indeed be negligible, the above papers all require that the valuation space be bounded. Therefore, while this approach can guarantee negligible loss in revenue, this technique, as used in the literature so far, is unsuitable for the analysis of unbounded valuation spaces as in as in our setting.
To overcome the above-described limitations of the core/tail decomposition technique, we take a more subtle approach, by analyzing core and tail regions together. We rst show (in Step 1 below) that one does not lose much revenue by disregarding what can be described as "second-order" tails, i.e., valuations where two or more of the item prices lie in the tail. Then, we show how to gradually simplify an optimal auction (which may be arbitrarily complex, even in nite in size) for the valuation space consisting of the core plus all rst-order tails while losing only a tiny fraction of the revenue in each step. For every modi cation that we perform to the menu, we must "simultaneously" check that we do not signi cantly hurt the revenue from either core or ( rst-order) tail buyers. To gradually simplify the menu, we rst carefully modify the menu so that only a small number of menu entries have a high price (this is the most technically elaborate part of the proof, performed in Steps 2 and 3 below), and then (in Step 4 below) round the menu entries with low prices to a nite grid using "nudge and round" operations. At this point, the use of "nudge and round" onto a nite grid is possible without signi cant revenue loss since the price of the menu entries that we round is bounded. Nonetheless, care still has to be taken beyond previous "nudge and round" uses, to ensure that this rounding does not incentivize buyers in the ( rst-order) tails to switch to buying a lower-priced rounded entry. Before moving on to the de nitions and formal statements and proof, we rst give a somewhat more detailed, yet still high-level, overview of each of the four steps of the proof.
Step 1: Move to an "almost bounded" valuation space. This step, taken in Section 2.3, simpli es the valuation space by showing that since item prices are independent, nding an approximately optimal auction under the assumption that at most one item has a price higher than H (i.e., has a price that lies in the H -tail), for some H = poly(n, 1 /ε), entails a very small loss compared to doing so without this assumption. This is possible, very roughly speaking, because the probability of two item prices lying in the tail, for H as above, can be thought of as being of order ε 2 , while the revenue conditioned upon being in this "second-order" tail (i.e., conditioned upon the prices of both of these items lying in the H -tail) is of order 1 /ε. Therefore, it is enough to construct our nite approximation for the distribution conditioned upon being in the valuation space comprised of the core and the rst-order tail, i.e., the valuation space where at most one item price lies in the tail. We call distributions over this valuation space exclusively unbounded distributions. We note that this is the only step in which the independence of the item prices is used; indeed, combining the remaining steps shows that the revenue from all exclusive unbounded distributions (even highly correlated distributions not originating from a product distribution over R n + ) can be uniformly approximated using nite-size menus (see Proposition 2.12 in Section 2.8).
Step 2: Modify expensive menu items to behave "almost like" singleitem auctions. This step, taken in Section 2.4, starts with an optimal (possibly arbitrarily complex) revenue-maximizing auction for some exclusively unbounded distribution. In this step, we simplify the "expensive" part of the menu, i.e., the part of the menu consisting of all menu entries that cost more than E, for some E = poly(n, 1 /ε), so that each expensive menu entry allocates only a single item with non-zero probability. This means that while in the "cheap" part of the menu we can allocate arbitrary combinations of items, once the price increases beyond E, our auction must act like a unit-demand one and never allocate more than a single item. We call such an auction E-exclusive. This is possible since, roughly speaking, due to the assumption of exclusive unboundedness, most of the value from an expensive menu entry chosen by some buyer type comes only from the unique item whose price lies in the tail for the valuation of that buyer type. Thus, instead of o ering that (nonexclusive) menu entry, we o er an (exclusive) entry with only the corresponding winning probability of that item, for a slightly discounted price. While in most natural cases, this step in fact increases the size of the expensive part of the menu (as each expensive menu entry possibly becomes n exclusive menu entries, each allocating a distinct item with non-zero probability), this simpli cation allows the next step to signi cantly reduce the size of this part of the menu.
Step 3: Apply Myerson's result to obtain "almost one" expensive entry per item. This step, taken in Section 2.5, reduces the size of the expensive part of the menu to at most 2n menu entries. This is the most technically elaborate step. Since E-exclusivity means that the expensive auction entries "look like" separate auctions for each of the n items, we show that we are able to carefully use the analysis of Myerson (1981) to replace each of these separate expensive auctions with a simple "almost deterministic" one. In contrast to Myerson's single (non-zero) menu entry, we require two menu entries for each item: a deterministic one analogous to Myerson's "optimal price" entry, and an additional randomized one analogous to the "opt out" zero entry in Myerson's auction. The function of the latter entry is to make sure that buyers are not incentivized to "jump" from the expensive part to the cheap part of the menu following the reduction of the size of the former.
Step 4: Discretize cheap menu entries "almost to a grid". This nal step, taken in Section 2.6, simpli es the cheap part of the menu by "rounding" the menu entries into a discrete set. We note that even at this point in the proof, the "nudge and round" techniques that allowed this rounding to be done with only negligible loss of revenue for bounded valuations in previous papers (Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012; Dughmi et al. 2014; Hart and Nisan 2013) cannot just be used "out of the box" in this step. Indeed, slight changes in allocation probabilities may result in large revenue changes, since the valuation space is not bounded but only exclusively unbounded. Nonetheless, these techniques can be carefully extended to be used here as well. Roughly speaking, we construct n discretizations of each cheap menu entry, where each discretization rounds the price and all but one allocation; rounding in the right direction guarantees that at least one of these discretizations is still a leading candidate for any buyer type that previously chose the corresponding original (nondiscretized) menu entry. As all but one coordinate of each of the discretized menu entries lie on a grid, we show that only nitely many of the menu entries are in fact chosen by any buyer type.
While the second and third (and rst) steps each entail a slight multiplicative revenue drop, the fourth step entails also a slight additive revenue drop. Recall, however, that we aim to achieve only a slight multiplicative drop (with no additional additive drop) in overall revenue. To obtain this result, when combining all of the above steps in Section 2.7 we assume w.l.o.g. that Max i Re (F i ) is normalized 6 (by scaling the currency) to a suitable value such that the additive drop in the fourth step can be quanti ed to be less than a slight multiplicative drop. Clearly, as the obtained bound on the overall cumulative revenue drop for normalized auctions is purely multiplicative, the proof also implies the same multiplicative bound for all (even nonnormalized) distributions.
Preliminaries
De nition 2.1 (Notation).
• (Naturals). We denote the strictly positive natural numbers by N {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
• ([n]). For every n ∈ N, we de ne [n] {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• (Nonnegative Reals). We denote the nonnegative reals by R + {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}.
De nition 2.2 (Outcome; Type; Utility). Let n ∈ N be a number of items.
(1) An outcome is an (n + 1)-tuple (ì x; p) = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ; p) ∈ [0, 1] n × R + , denoting an allocation (to the buyer) of every item i ∈ [n] with probability x i , for a total price (paid by the buyer) of p. (2) We denote the (expected) utility of a (risk-neutral additive) buyer with type (respective item valuations)
De nition 2.3 (IC Auction as Menu). Let n ∈ N be a number of items. By the taxation principle, we identify any incentivecompatible (IC) n-item auction with a (possibly in nitely large) menu of outcomes (the entries in the menu are all the possible outcomes of the auction), where by IC the buyer chooses an entry that maximizes her utility. 7 If the auction is individually rational (IR), then we assume w.l.o.g. that the menu includes the entry ( ì 0; 0) that allocates no item and costs nothing. (Conversely, if the menu includes the entry ( ì 0; 0), then the auction is IR.) Following Hart and Nisan (2013), we de ne the menu size of an IC and IR auction as the number of entries, except ( ì 0; 0), in the menu of that auction.
De nition 2.4 (Re M ; Re C ; Re ). Let n ∈ N be a number of items and let F ∈ ∆(R n + ) be a distribution over R n + .
(1) Given an IC and IR n-item auction M, we denote the (expected) revenue obtainable by M from (a single riskneutral additive buyer with type distributed according to) F , by
The cases in which Max i Re (F i ) cannot be normalized, i.e., when it is 0 or in nite, are easy to handle separately. In the former case, there is nothing to show. In the latter case, Re (F i ) = ∞ for some i ∈ [n], and so by the theorem of Myerson (1981) , an arbitrarily high revenue can be extracted using a take-it-or-leave-it o er for item i.
7 If the menu is in nite, then the fact that it corresponds to an IC auction guarantees that some menu entry maximizes the utility of each buyer type. See Appendix B.1.1 for more details.
where p( ) is the price of the entry from M that maximizes the utility of , with ties broken in favor of higher prices. 8,9 (2) Given C ∈ N, we denote the highest revenue (more accurately, the supremum of the revenues) obtainable from F by an IC and IR n-item auction with at most C menu entries by
(3) We denote the highest revenue (more accurately, the supremum of the revenues) obtainable from F by an IC and IR n-item auction by
At Most One High Price
As outlined above, our rst step toward proving Theorem 1.2, which we take in this section, simpli es the valuation space by showing that since item prices are independent, any auction that extracts most of the revenue under the assumption that the valuation space is restricted to some H -exclusively unbounded valuation space, i.e., to a valuation space where for each buyer type at most one item has price higher than some H = poly(n, 1 /ε), also extracts most of the revenue without this assumption. This step is formalized by Lemma 2.7, which we state below and whose proof we relegate to the full paper.
De nition 2.5 (EU n H ; Exclusively Unbounded Type Distribution). Let H ∈ R + and n ∈ N.
(1) We denote the subset of R n + where at most one coordinate is greater than H by
De nition 2.6 (F | A ). For a set A and a distribution F de ned over some superset of A s.t. A is measurable and F (A) > 0, we denote the conditional distribution of ∼ F conditioned upon ∈ A by F | A . Formally, for every measurable set B ⊆ A, we de ne F | A (B)
8 The results of this paper hold regardless of the tie-breaking rule chosen. See Appendix B.2 for more details. 9 If the menu is in nite, then the fact that a utility-maximizing menu entry exists for every buyer type does not guarantee that a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price (among all utility-maximizing entries) exists for every buyer type. (I.e., it is not guaranteed that the supremum price over all utility-maximizing entries is attained as a maximum.) Indeed, to be completely general, a more subtle de nition of the revenue obtainable by an IC auction would have been needed. Nonetheless, for the auctions considered in this paper, this subtle de nition is not required as we make sure that they all possess, for each buyer type, a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price. See Appendix B.1.2 for more details.
(3) For every a ∈ (0, 1] and for every IC and IR n-item auction M,
Exclusivity at Expensive Menu Entries
Having proven Lemma 2.7, we phrase and prove the next steps for arbitrary exclusively unbounded distributions, i.e., not necessarily product distributions conditioned upon EU n H . As outlined above, our second step toward proving Theorem 1.2, which we take in this section, shows that in any auction over some exclusively unbounded distribution, the "expensive" part of the menu, i.e., the part of the menu consisting of all menu entries that cost more than some E = poly(n, 1 /ε), can be simpli ed without signi cant loss in revenue to make the auction E-exclusive, i.e., to make each expensive menu entry only allocate a single item with non-zero probability. This step is formalized by Lemma 2.9, which we state below and whose proof we relegate to the full paper.
De nition 2.8 (Exclusive Auction). Let n ∈ N and let E ∈ R + . We say that an n-item auction is E-exclusive if it allocates (with positive probability) at most one item whenever it charges strictly more than E. 10 L 2.9. Let n ∈ N s.t. n ≥ 2, let H ∈ R + , let ε ∈ (0, 1), and set E 4·(n−1)·H ε 2
. For every F ∈ ∆(EU n H ) and for every IC and IR n-item auction M, there exists an E-exclusive IC and IR n-item auction M such that Re M (F ) ≥ (1 − ε) · Re M (F ).
Trimming the Expensive Part of the Menu
As outlined above, our third step toward proving Theorem 1.2, which we take in this section, shows that in any exclusive auction over some exclusively unbounded distribution, the expensive part of the menu can be simpli ed without signi cant loss in revenue, so that it contains at most 2n menu entries. This step, which is the most technically elaborate of all steps, is formalized by Lemma 2.10, which we state below and whose proof we relegate to the full paper. L 2.10. Let n ∈ N s.t. n ≥ 2, let H ∈ R + , let ε ∈ (0, 1), and let E ≥ Max n ·H +2, (n−1)·H +1 ε . For every F ∈ ∆(EU n H ) and for every E-exclusive IC and IR n-item auction M, there exists an E-exclusive IC and IR n-item auction M , such that both of the following hold.
• Re M (F ) ≥ (1 − ε) · Re M (F ).
• (The set of menu entries in) M coincides with a subset of the set of menu entries in M that cost at most E, with the addition of at most 2n menu entries.
Discretizing the Cheap Part of the Menu
As outlined above, our fourth and nal step toward proving Theorem 1.2, which we take in this section, shows that in any auction over some exclusively unbounded distribution, the "cheap" part of the menu can be simpli ed without signi cant loss in revenue and without increasing the number of menu entries in the expensive part, so that (if both the parameter H de ning the exclusive unboundedness of the distribution and the parameter E de ning the cheap part of the menu are polynomial in n and 1 /ε) it contains at most ( n /ε) O (n) menu entries. This step is formalized by Lemma 2.11, which we state below and whose proof we relegate to the full paper. L 2.11. Let n ∈ N, let H ∈ R + , let E ∈ R + , and let ε ∈ (0, 1). For every F ∈ ∆(EU n H ) and for every IC and IR n-item auction M, there exists an IC and IR n-item auction M such that all of the following hold.
• Re M (F ) ≥ (1 − ε) · Re M (F ) − ε.
• The menu entries that cost more than (1 − ε) · E in M are precisely the menu entries that cost more than E in M, each given a multiplicative price discount of (1 − ε). In particular, there are as many menu entries that cost more than (1 −ε) · E in M as there are that cost more than E in M.
• There are fewer than n · n ·H
Connecting the Dots
In the full paper, we "connect the dots" and use Lemmas 2.7 and 2.9 through 2.11 to prove Theorem 1.2, which states that C(n, ε) is nite for every number of items n ∈ N and ε > 0, and moreover, that C(n, ε) ≤ ( n /ε) O (n) . We note that, as mentioned in Section 1, it is possible to strengthen the upper bound on C(n, ε) from ( n /ε) O (n) to ( log n /ε) O (n) , but at a cost of a messier presentation. As this stronger bound is still exponential in n, we have decided not to present the more involved proof for this bound. Nonetheless, we comment that the only change required to prove this stronger bound is to Lemma 2.11, where by following along the same lines as the proof above (i.e., discretizing each cheap menu entry n times, each time rounding-down all but one allocation probability, etc.), but utilizing discretization techniques of Hart and Nisan (2013) and Dughmi et al. (2014) to round to a more carefully chosen grid, one may show an improved upper bound for the number of menu entries into which it is possible to discretize the cheap part of the menu in Lemma 2.11. (Note that other than for the cheap part of the menu, the remaining lemmas show that we only need at most 2n more entries for the expensive part of the menu, and therefore no modi cation is required to these lemmas, which either way contain most of the conceptual and technical "beef" of the proof, in order to show the stronger upper bound.)
Arbitrary Exclusively Unbounded Type Distributions
We emphasize once more that in contrast to the rst step (Lemma 2.7) of the proof of Theorem 1.2, the remaining three steps (i.e., Lemmas 2.9 through 2.11) hold for any exclusively unbounded type distribution, and not merely for one obtained by conditioning product distributions upon EU n H . Therefore, these steps allow us to derive results also for such distributions. Indeed, a proof similar to that of Theorem 1.2 (only without using Lemma 2.7) yields: P 2.12. For every n ∈ N, H ∈ R + , and ε > 0, there exists C = C(n, H, ε) ≤ n ·H ε O (n) such that for every (possibly even highly correlated) F ∈ ∆(EU n H ), we have that
Proposition 2.12 states that a menu size of n ·H ε O (n) guarantees a multiplicative approximation of at least (1−ε) for the revenue from any exclusively unbounded distribution (e.g., in particular from any distribution over R + × [1, H ] n−1 ), thereby generalizing a similar result by Hart and Nisan (2013) . Similarly to the discussion concluding Section 2.7 (using the techniques of Nisan 2013, and Dughmi et al. 2014 , in precisely the same way), the upper bound in Proposition 2.12 can be improved to the same upper bound of
, therefore generalizing also the result of Dughmi et al. (2014) from bounded to exclusively unbounded valuations.
Finally, we note that an exclusively unbounded valuation space is essentially the maximal valuation space for which a result along the lines of Proposition 2.12 can be shown, since Hart and Nisan (2013) show that for two items with unbounded valuations (and as a result, for any number of items where the valuations of at least two items are unbounded), no nite menu size can guarantee any xed fraction of the optimal revenue. Proposition 2.12 therefore shows that the use of distributions where the valuations of the two items grow arbitrarily large together (like the distribution used in the proof of Hart and Nisan 2013) cannot be avoided in any proof of this impossibility result.
A SMALL MENU FOR ITEM PRICING
In this section, we survey the proof of Theorem 1.5, which states that for every ε > 0, there exists d = d(ε) such that for every number of items n ∈ N and F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n ∈ ∆(R + ), we have for
Concretely, we show that the theorem holds for d ≤ O(ε −5 ).
De nition 3.1 (SRe ). Let n ∈ N be a number of items and let F = F 1 × F 2 × · · · × F n ∈ ∆(R + ) n be a product distribution over R n + . We denote the (expected) revenue obtainable from F by selling each of the n items separately via a revenue-maximizing auction by
Re (F i ).
Remark 3.1. By the theorem of Myerson (1981) , the menu size (not including ( ì 0; 0)) of the auction obtaining revenue SRe (F ) by selling each of the n items separately via a revenue-maximizing auction is at most 2 n − 1.
The main idea underlying the proof of Theorem 1.5, whose full details we relegate to the full paper, is that instead of holding n separate auctions (one for each item), which may result in an exponential-size menu, we hold exponentially fewer separate auctions, which result in a polynomial-size menu. Recall that for every item i, by the theorem of Myerson (1981) , the optimal separateselling revenue Re (F i ) can be obtained via a take-it-or-leave-it o er for selling item i (with probability 1) for a certain price c i . Let p i be the probability item i is sold (if it is o ered for the price c i ). The separate auctions that we perform are as follows:
• For each item for which c i is very small (say, at most an ε /n fraction) compared to SRe (F ), the optimal (separateselling) revenue Re (F i ) is very small compared to SRe (F ) as well, and therefore the sum of the optimal revenues from all of these items is small compared to SRe (F ). Therefore, we allow ourselves to not sell any of these items at all (or alternatively, give them to the buyer for free).
• For each item for which c i is very large (say, by at least a factor of n /ε) compared to Re (F i ), the probability that the item is sold (when selling items separately) is small. Hence, the probability that two or more of these items are sold is small. Therefore, we can a ord to allow the buyer to buy at most only one of these items (for the same price c i as when selling each item separately) without incurring a signi cant loss in revenue. We therefore o er the buyer at most n + 1 choices for these items.
• We partition the remaining items (those with "nonextreme" values of c i ) into O(log n) many bundles, each to be o ered (via a separate auction) to the buyer at a take-it-or-leave-it price described below, where the ratio between the (optimal separate-selling) prices of any two items in a single bundle is small. Moreover, we show that this can be done s.t. each such bundle has p i either very large or very small.
-For each bundle with p i very large, we show that the buyer's valuation of the bundle is tightly concentrated, allowing us to extract almost all of this valuation by o ering the bundle for a price slightly below the expectation of this valuation. -For each bundle with p i very small, not unlike the case of the high-costing items above, we show that the probability of two or more of the items in the bundle being sold (when selling separately) is small. Since the prices of all of these items are similar, instead of allowing the buyer to buy at most one of these items (for its separate-selling price c i ) as in the case of the high-costing items above (thereby o ering as many choices to the buyer for these items as there are items in the bundle), we simply o er the entire bundle for the cheapest (optimal separate-selling) price of any of the items in the bundle. We can a ord to do so without incurring a signi cant loss in revenue since all of the items in the bundle have similar prices. As each of these O(log n) many bundles is o ered via a takeit-or-leave-it price, we o er the buyer altogether at most poly(n) choices for (buying any subset of) these bundles.
LOWER BOUND ON REVENUE-APPROXIMATION COMPLEXITY
In this section, we survey the proof of Theorem 1.7, which states that C(n, 1 /n) ≥ 2 Ω(n) . We consider the simple distribution where the value of each item is (independently) either 0 or 1, each with probability 50%. Thus, the buyer is interested in (i.e., has value > 0 for the items in) a random subset of the items (where each subset is chosen with probability exactly 2 −n ), and has value 1 for each item in this subset. A revenue-maximizing auction for this setting o ers each item, separately, for a take-it-or-leave-it price of 1; viewed as a menu, this auction has a menu entry for each nonempty bundle of items ∅ S ⊆ [n], which sells this bundle S for a price of |S |. This auction clearly maximizes the revenue, as it extracts the full social welfare (i.e., expected sum of item valuations), which is n /2, as revenue. An alternative auction, which has only a single menu entry, sells the whole bundle for a price that is slightly less than n /2, so that with high probability the size of the set of desired items is at least this price (in which case the bundle is sold). Choosing the price to be n /2 − ω( √ n) is required in order for the probability of selling the bundle to be subconstant. Therefore, this simple auction loses (about) a 1 √ n fraction of the revenue. In the proof, we show that such a 1 /n c loss of revenue is necessary in every simple-enough auction, i.e., in every auction having subexponentially many menu entries.
We will now roughly sketch the intuition underlying the proof, whose full details we relegate to the full paper. Consider an auction that loses less than, say, a 1 10n fraction of the revenue. This means that for most of the 2 n possible bundles of desired items, the payment extracted from a buyer interested in (precisely the items in) that bundle must be higher than the bundle size minus 1 /2. Let us say that a buyer type that is interested in (precisely the items in) a bundle S pays full price if the auction extracts a payment higher than |S | − 1 /2 from a buyer of this type. The basic idea is that, roughly speaking, if a buyer type that is interested in a bundle S pays full price, then this buyer type "should" have a menu entry "for itself" that allocates S for a price close to |S |. The reason is that two buyer types interested in bundles of di erent sizes cannot both choose the same entry and both pay full price (as the buyer type interested in the smaller-sized bundle would not want to buy at the "full price" of the other buyer). We note that it is true that buyer types interested in identically sized bundles T S can still "share" the same menu entry and both pay full price; indeed, this can happen if the entry that they both choose allocates the union S ∪ T for a price close to |S | = |T |. This, however, would imply that a buyer type interested in S ∪ T does not pay full price, since this menu entry already o ers a discount for the bundle S ∪ T . Our proof formalizes this intuition: if "too many" buyer types pay full price and choose the same menu entry (which must be the case with a small menu that extracts almost all of the revenue), then we show that buyer types interested in many subsets or their union cannot pay full price, leading to a signi cant loss in revenue.
A MENU SIZE AND COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
One may view the menu size of an auction is as exactly characterizing its (deterministic) communication complexity. To see this easy correspondence, we should rst carefully de ne the communication complexity. In the communication complexity scenario, we have a commonly known mechanism (in the intended application it may be determined by the commonly known distributions F 1 , . . . , F n on item values). Our single buyer also has a privately known valuation, and the seller has no private knowledge. The auction is just a function that maps the buyer's valuation to the allocation and payment for this valuation.
De nition A.1 (Deterministic Communication Complexity). The deterministic communication complexity of a given auction is the minimal number of bits that must be exchanged, in the worst case, by the buyer and seller in order for both of them to compute the allocation and payment for the buyer's valuation.
We can immediately notice that since the seller has no private information, then the buyer may simulate him completely, and thus there is never any need for the seller to transmit anything. It follows that without loss of generality, the communication is one-sided: the buyer transmits some information about his valuation, which su ces to determine the outcome of the auction (allocation and payment). Thus, if some (pre x free) communication protocol for the auction uses at most c bits of communication, then there are at most 2 c possible outcomes, i.e., the menu size of the auction is at most 2 c . Conversely, if the auction has a menu-size of C, then clearly the buyer need only transmit her chosen menu entry, which requires log 2 C bits of information. We have thus observed the following. P A.2. The deterministic communication complexity of an auction is exactly the logarithm (base 2, rounded up) of the menu size of the auction.
Note also that once the auction is incentive compatible, this characterization of the communication complexity holds whether or not the communication protocol is required to be incentive compatible: the lower bound on the communication complexity applies even without any incentive requirements, while the upper bound protocol is clearly incentive compatible.
The de nition of randomized communication complexity may be more subtle: one de nition would just require a randomized protocol that computes, with high probability, the required outcome. A more natural de nition, however, would just require the distribution of the outcomes of the protocol to be that speci ed by the auction.
De nition A.3 (Randomized Communication Complexity). The randomized communication complexity of an auction is the expected number of bits of communication required, for the worst case input, in a randomized protocol whose probability of allocating each item and whose expected payment are as speci ed by the auction.
As it turns out, this de nition of randomized communication complexity is a much easier benchmark to satisfy, at least as long as we allow "public coins" (i.e., as long as we assume that the buyer and seller share a randomly generated string, whose length is not counted toward the communication). For instance, one may in fact implement any single-item auction with a single bit of communication under a public-coin model. By a theorem of Myerson (1981) , an IC single-item auction is completely speci ed by 1) the probability of allocation x( ) for every value , where x(·) is a nondecreasing function, and 2) the payment p 0 of a buyer with valuation 0. Suppose that the buyer and seller choose (jointly, without any communication cost) a price p at random so that x(p) is exactly uniform on [0, 1]. To get the correct allocation, it su ces for the buyer to get the item if ≥ p (requiring one bit of communication), which indeed happens with probability exactly x( ). If we charge the buyer exactly p + p 0 when she gets the item and p 0 when she does not get the item, then the expected payment turns out to be as required.
It is not completely clear to us how large the public-coin randomized complexity can be in the case of multiple items, nor is it clear how large the private-coin randomized complexity can be.
B TECHNICAL NOTES B.1 In nite Menus B.1.1 Utility-Maximizing Entries. As is well known in the literature, by the taxation principle every (single-buyer) IC auction with nitely many possible outcomes can be identi ed with a nite menu of possible choices for the buyer (where by IC the buyer chooses an entry that maximizes her utility), and vice versa. For IC auctions with in nitely many possible outcomes, while it is still true that each such auction can be identi ed with an (in nite) menu of possible choices for the buyer, it is no longer the case that every such menu de nes some IC auction. Indeed, in a general in nite menu, a utility-maximizing entry for each buyer type does not necessarily exist, yet in menus corresponding to IC auctions, such an entry always exists. We note that one way to make sure that a (possibly in nite) menu that we construct indeed de nes an IC auction is to make sure that this menu is closed (as a subset of [0, 1] n × R + ). (This is the technique employed in our proofs of Lemmas 2.9 and 2.11. 11 ) Indeed, for a buyer type = ( 1 , . . . , n ) ∈ R n + , all nonnegative-utility entries from a closed menu M lie in the compact set M ∩ [0, 1] n × 0, n i=1 i , and by continuity of the utility function, this function attains a maximum value in this compact set.
B.1.2 Tie-Breaking by Prices. De nition 2.4(1), which is the standard de nition of the revenue obtainable by an IC auction, species that ties (in utility) between menu entries are broken in favor of higher prices. We note that even if, in some menu, a utilitymaximizing menu entry exists for some buyer type (or for all buyer types), then it is not guaranteed that a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price (among all utility-maximizing entries) exists for this buyer type. (I.e., it is not guaranteed that the supremum price over all utility-maximizing entries for this buyer type is attained as a maximum.) Indeed, to be completely general, a more subtle de nition of the revenue obtainable by an IC auction would have been needed (taking, roughly speaking, the supremum revenue over all tie-breaking rules), and even under such a de nition, the menu entry of choice of a speci c buyer type would not have been well de ned (or would have become a limit of menu entries), making reasoning about such auctions quite cumbersome. Nonetheless, similarly to above, if an IC auction has a closed menu, then it possesses, for each buyer type, a utility-maximizing entry with maximal price, and so the revenue is well de ned by De nition 2.4(1), without the need for a more subtle de nition. Indeed, the set of utilitymaximizing entries from a given closed menu for a given buyer type is (by the reasoning given in Appendix B.1.1) a compact set; therefore, it contains an entry with maximum price. The only point in the proofs in this paper where we do not explicitly construct an auction by specifying its menu is in the proof of Theorem 1.2, where we start with an IC (and IR) auction (possibly of in nite size) that obtains revenue close to Re (F ); to justify the fact that we can assume w.l.o.g. that the menu of such an auction is closed, we note that if some menu entry e is weakly preferred by some buyer type to all menu entries in some menu M, then by continuity of the utility function, e is weakly preferred by also to all menu entries in the M -the closure of M (in [0, 1] n ×R + ). Therefore, given an IC auction M that obtains revenue R from a distribution F under some tie-breaking rule, we have that M, under price-maximization tiebreaking (which is well de ned since M is closed), obtains revenue at least R from F .
B.2 Arbitrary Tie-Breaking
As discussed above, the (standard) de nition that we use for the revenue obtainable by a given IC auction (De nition 2.4(1)) depends on tie-breaking being performed in favor of higher prices. Nonetheless, we emphasize that the de nition of the revenue obtainable from a given distribution F , whether constrained by the menu size (i.e., Re C ) or unconstrained (i.e., Re ), does not depend on the tie-breaking rule. Indeed, if an auction M obtains revenue R w.r.t. tie-breaking in favor of high prices, then for arbitrarily small ε > 0, multiplying the price of each menu entry in M by (1 −ε) and taking the closure of the resulting menu (equivalently, multiplying the price of each menu entry in M by (1−ε)), yields an auction with the same menu size (since a nite menu is always closed) that obtains revenue at least (1 − ε) · R w.r.t. any tie-breaking rule (since multiplying each price by (1 − ε) breaks ties in favor of higher-priced menu entries, and can only cause a buyer type to "jump" to even higher-costing menu entries). As the de nitions of Re C and Re therefore do not depend on the tie-breaking rule, our results hold for any tie-breaking rules, e.g., even tie-breaking in favor of low prices in the de nition of Re C and in favor of high prices in the de nition of Re .
